Abstract
I. Introduction
It has frequently been argued that financial markets can provide strong discipline over the financial behavior of governments and central banks. This view is personified in the comment made by a former presidential advisor that if he were reincarnated he'd like to come back as the financial market because then he could scare anyone. To many, such discipline would be a good thing, helping to offset various biases toward excessive financial laxity discussed in the literatures on time inconsistency problems, political business cycles, etc. To others, generally from the left of the political spectrum, such discipline is seen as being excessively harsh, forcing governments to curtail desirable actions.
Both of these frequently expressed views share the assumption that for good or ill, financial markets do provide considerable discipline over the decision making of public officials.
Recent analysis, however, suggests that such discipline is often lacking. Indeed the frequency of financial crises themselves suggests the limitations of this discipline hypothesis, at least in its strong form that market discipline will force governments to correct policies that are heading toward crises.
Two things are required for this strong form of the discipline hypothesis to work: that markets give early warning signals that government policies are heading towards problems and that governments then respond to these signals. As documented in Willett, Chiu, and Walter (2014) there are many cases in which financial markets have failed to give any substantial early warning signals. The failure of interest rate premia to rise substantially on government debt of countries such as Greece before the outbreak of the euro crises is an important recent example.
Similarly Prabha, Wihlborg, and Willett (2012) find little evidence of strongly rising risk premia on the debt of the major commercial banks before the US subprime crisis.
Once the euro crisis broke out, however, it appears that financial markets "woke up" and at least until the time of the ECB's commitment to do whatever it takes to save the euro, they reacted sensitively to the policies being adopted. Indeed some have argued that during the height of the euro crisis the markets imposed excessively harsh discipline on governments. While much more detailed analysis is necessary these developments suggest that there is likely a good bit of truth to the discipline during crises hypothesis.
In this paper we explore a third type of discipline hypothesis. Do painful financial crises induce governments and private sector decision makers to adopt more prudent policies for the future? In other words is there learning from the mistakes associated with crises? While such learning behavior seems quite plausible it is not obvious how strong the effect will be. In some countries special interest forces may continue to generate excessive credit creation even in the face of public demands for reform. Regulatory reforms that are undertaken may prove to be largely ineffective in the face of such pressures. There may also be considerable disagreement about the major causes of crises and hence what lessons should be learned. For example at the political level the right in the United states has frequently argued that the major cause of the subprime crisis was excessive government interference in the housing markets while many on the left have blamed excessive financial deregulation. 1 There is also a well-known tendency for memories to be short. This isn't always the case.
The horrors of the German hyperinflation still inform the anti-inflation attitudes of the German officials and the general public. Still tendencies to lapse into past excesses cannot be fully discounted and our analysis finds a number of examples of such failures.
Our focus is on the extent to which banking crises tend to provide future discipline in the form of lower rates of credit growth than those prior to the crisis. We compare the rates of credit growth that preceded banking crises with subsequent growth rates. Of course bank credit tends to fall while a crisis is in process and this is typically the result more of the direct effects of the crisis than better disciplined policies. Thus we compare rates of credit growth after, not during, the crisis period with those that preceded the crisis.
Of course excessive credit growth is not the only cause of banking crises so comparing before and after rates of credit growth does not capture the full range of possible discipline effects but there has been considerable research on the relationship between credit growth and banking crises. The general conclusion of this research is that while many credit booms do not end in banking crises a majority of banking crises are preceded by credit booms. For example, Mendoza and Terrones (2008) find slightly over a majority of crises in their sample are preceded by credit booms while Elekdag and Wu (2011) find 69 percent of crises were preceded by booms in their sample.
High credit growth is the result of a combination of financial sector and government decisions and regulations. For example in the US subprime crisis excessive risk taking by banks played a major role, while Alan Greenspan's belief that competition in the banking sector would provide sufficient discipline (such that little regulatory oversight was needed) proved to be false.
Many argue that the low interest rate policy of the Federal Reserve also contributed importantly to the buildup of the housing and credit bubble. For the most part regulators had the ability to offset these factors but failed to do so. Thus the bubble was the result of the interaction of a number of government and private sector policies. It would be hoped that the crisis would 1 This divide is reflected among others in the Final Report of the National Commission of the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the US (Angelides and Thomas 2011) . The majority report (chaired by Phil Angelides, a Democrat) included two dissenting statements from Republican members of the commission: one written by Wallis and another by Henessey, Holtz-Eakin, and Thomas. generate better discipline over all of these major factors but we believe that it is reasonable to focus initially on the composite effects.
While we will likely never be able to fully accurately assign relative weights to the various factors that contribute to these outcomes, it is possible to explore some aspects of these composite effects. In section 3 we investigate to what extent financial crises are followed by strengthening of financial regulation and supervision, i.e. to what extent is there an increase in regulatory discipline. 2 Our results indicate that while on average rates of credit growth fall and financial supervision is strengthened following crises there are substantial differences across countries in the responses of both credit growth and strengthening of financial supervision. Thus it becomes important to attempt to understand the major factors that influence these differences. We begin this process by investigating the roles of democracy and of the presence of IMF programs in influencing these reactions. We find strong correlations between both democracy and IMF programs and the amounts of drops in rates of credit expansion following crises.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we describe the data on credit growth and banking crisis, and we explain how we set up the data for analysis. In section III we present cross-country comparisons of changes in credit growth from the pre-to the post-crisis periods.
Section IV looks at changes in the strength of regulation and supervision after banking crises, while sections V and VI investigate the effects of IMF programs and democracy. Section VII offers concluding comments.
II. Set Up and Data Description
This study examines 58 banking crisis (country-year) episodes, the onset years of which occurred between 1980-2003, and we focus on a sub-set of 42 crisis episodes which were 2 Some studies have looked at the effects of crises on financial liberalization more generally (e.g. Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi 2014 and Rosas, Aguilera, and Ward 2013) . However, it is not clear whether more financial liberalization unambiguously enhances post-crisis discipline effects. For example, financial liberalization that is accompanied by stronger capital regulation and supervision should reduce the likelihood of banking crises (e.g. Angkinand et al. 2010 ). Thus we focus on strengthening of prudential supervision which should unambiguously be associated with more discipline. It should be noted, however, that strengthening of formal financial oversight does not always translate into more effective supervision in practice. For example the high scores that the US received in the standard measures of quality of regulation (Abiad et al. 2008) did not keep regulators from failing to take sufficient actions to head off the US sub-prime crisis.
preceded by positive pre-crisis credit expansion. 3 Our main variables of interest are credit growth, banking crisis, capital regulation and supervision (CRS), IMF programs 4 and democracy scores. CRS is proxied by a score measuring countries' compliance with international standards of banking supervision taken from Abiad et al. (2008) , while data set on degrees of democracy are taken from Polity 2 and the combined scores of Freedom House and Polity 2. A more detailed explanation on the CRS and democracy measurements can be found in sections IV-VI.
Banking crisis data is taken from Laeven and Valencia (2012) who document occurrences of systemic banking crisis worldwide 5 . In this data set, 6 a country experiences the onset of a banking crisis in a particular year if there is either a significant bank run or a substantial government intervention to rescue the banking sector (bank holiday, deposit freeze, liquidity support, or outright bank takeovers). This data set is chosen because it has the widest country and period coverage of all existing data sets (it covers 145 countries with over 150 crisis episodes).
As discussed in the introduction, in an attempt to capture what constitutes "excessive" credit growth, scholars have used a number of different measures of private credit growth with varying results (see Table 1 for a summary). The two main underlying measures are growth in real credit and growth in credit/GDP. Each of these measures is designed to take into account one of the important factors that should influence the rate of non-excessive credit growth. Ideally one would like to compare actual credit growth with the results of a well-specified equation indicating what rate of credit growth is appropriate. Unfortunately there is no agreement in the literature on how such appropriate levels of credit growth should be estimated. This is reflected in the various measures that have been used to identify periods of credit booms. Thus we have adopted the cruder measures that have been used in the recent literature. In our preliminary analysis, we chose real growth of credit instead of growth of credit/GDP, since the latter measure 3 Ideally we would like to include countries hit by the global financial crisis of 2007-09. However, given that we are comparing credit growth in the post-crisis period and we only have credit data up to 2010, we do not have sufficiently recent credit data to include these crises. 4 Participation in IMF programs are taken from a data set complied by Dreher (2006) . 5 Another widely-used data set for banking crises is Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2011) , which uses a smaller sample of countries. As there are some discrepancies between the two, we plan to do robustness checks using Reinhart and Rogoff's data set in the future. 6 We largely used banking crisis data from Laeven and Valencia (2012) in its original form, with some modifications. First, the authors code Brazil 1990 and 1994 as two separate cases of banking crisis. We exclude Brazil 1990 as an episode, given the authors' of the data set consider this a borderline crisis. Second, we exclude Chile 1976, given that the closure of banks only happened on a large scale in 1981.
does not account for the possibility that credit and GDP could have very different trends and recovery patterns after the crisis. In other words, we might face a situation where credit and GDP are falling individually; however, the growth in credit/GDP might go up because the fall in credit is smaller in magnitude than the fall in GDP. Therefore, we include a sensitivity analysis using these two different measures in the following section.
For our main analysis we follow the recent trend and use the growth of real credit 7 as our main measure, although we will also do sensitivity analysis using the other frequently used credit measure, the ratio of credit to GDP 8 . In our primary analysis we use the criterion that real credit growth before a crisis be positive and this condition is met for 42 of the 58 advanced and emerging market countries for which we were able to obtain a complete set of data.
The argument is that when high credit growth has not preceded a crisis then there would seem to be no major reason to try to reduce future credit growth. It is only when prior credit growth has been seen to be excessive that we would expect that there might be a learning experience that leads to reductions in future credit growth. Private credit data is taken from International Financial Statistics. We operationalize credit growth as the annual change in the natural log of real credit (the natural log of real credit in year t minus the natural log of real credit in year t-1). Following Beck et al. (2000) and Mendoza and Terrones (2008) , real credit is the average of two contiguous end-of-year values of nominal credit, deflated by the end-of-year consumer price index. Private credit is defined as amount of claims held by both banks and non-bank financial intermediaries to the non-financial private sector. 8 Other variables that are used are growth rates of the ratio of real bank credit to real GDP and real bank credit per capita. This sensitivity analysis has not been conducted yet. 9 That real credit growth be positive is a fairly weak criterion for inclusion and may bias the analysis against finding discipline effects. We plan to also investigate the responses to cases where credit booms (a situation where real credit exceeds its long-run trend over a threshold factor) have been formally identified preceding crises. 
Pre-and Post-Crisis Sample Periods: Choosing a Time Window
As our main data analysis compares time plots of growth rates of credit before and after the onset of banking crisis episodes, one important point regarding the data set up is the time window or what periods to choose as our pre-crisis sample and post-crisis sample. Previous research suggests that it takes a few years of high credit growth to generate crises Klingebiel 1997, Dell'Ariccia et al. 2012) . Behind a credit-growth induced banking crisis is a high number of bad loans. It could take a number of years for bad loans to accumulate and become evident that they need to be written-off. However, Amri, Prabha, and Wihlborg (2013) find that the preceding year or two is more substantively significant in explaining banking crises, compared to cumulative credit growth over 3-4 years preceding the crisis.
Given the foregoing, we take a conservative approach and use a four-year window for our average pre-crisis credit growth rates. 10 For the crisis period, examination of the data suggests that a conservative window to capture the declines in credit growth that usually occur during crises is again three years. Thus we begin our post crisis period at t plus four years and again use a four-year window. 11 In other words, taking t as the onset year of a banking crisis, years t-3 to years t make up the pre-crisis sample period, while years t+4 to t+7 make up the post-crisis sample period. Our choice is broadly in line with similar research that looked at how credit behaves after financial crises (i.e. during output recovery periods). For example, Takats and Upper 12 (2013) find that credit drops after a crisis on average level off within two years, which strengthens our case for deleting the 3-year period immediately after the onset of a banking crisis. We choose a 3-year window to delete in order to be conservative. Furthermore, while studying the relationship between capital flows and credit booms, Elekdag and Wu (2011) find that "typical credit boom lasts about three years, with a buildup, peak, and ending phase each lasting one year on average." One point to acknowledge is that even after deleting the threeyears immediately after the onset of a banking crisis, there are potential biases. One is that as a country recovers from a banking crisis, if there has been a sharp drop in credit during the crisis this may overshoot an appropriate level so that above average credit growth might be appropriate for a year or two. This would create a bias against finding discipline. Thus we believe that our estimates for cases of post-crisis discipline are conservative.
One way to allay concerns regarding this type of potential bias is to calculate how long it takes for credit to return to its "normal" levels. Yet defining what "normal" is would be difficult. Clearly, what we observe in one or two years before the crisis is not normal, as this is the period where credit overshoots (hence a credit boom). In fact, if the immediate pre-crisis credit growth is too high (and thus problematic), this is not the ideal level that we'd want to return to. Table 2 reports the average trend of credit and GDP during and after banking crises.
The second column reports average deviation of the log of real credit from its trend, using a Hodrick Prescott filter. 13 Nevertheless, the figures cited here suggest that our choice of time-11 Future sensitivity testing will vary these parameters. 12 Takats and Upper (2013, p. iii): "we examine data from 39 financial crises, which were preceded by credit booms. In these crises the change in bank credit, either in real terms or relative to GDP, consistently did not correlate with growth during the first two years of the recovery. In the third and fourth year, the correlation becomes statistically significant but remains small in economic terms." This paper also excludes financial crises which were not preceded by strong increase in credit and those which occurred in an environment of hyperinflation. 13 We follow the filtering method suggested by Mendoza and Terrones (2008) and Elekdag and Wu (2011) . We note however, that there are flaws in applying this type of filter, which assumes a linear trend. In particular, the trend line would be biased upward and incorporate strong credit growth before the crisis. We are currently investigating other possible filtering methods that might mitigate this problem.
window discussed in the previous paragraph is reasonable. For example, as seen from column 3, in the pre-crisis period (t-3 to t) we see that real credit does tend to blow up, enter the negative territory during the crisis and recovery period (t+1 to t+3) and in the post crisis period (t+4 to t+7), average real credit growth is no longer negative and starts to resemble the average figures observed before the crisis. 
III. Banking Crisis as Potential Source of Future Discipline: Examining Credit Growth Before and after a Financial Crisis
In this section we examine patterns in the changes in annual growth of real credit before and after banking crises episodes. Following the suggestion of Takats and Upper (2013), we exclude cases where average annual growth of real credit is negative before the crisis (e.g. Russia 1998 , Venezuela 1994 , Bolivia 1986 , and Poland 1992 . 14 To help fix ideas of post-crisis market discipline, in figures 1 and 2 below we present examples of a banking crisis episode that fits well with the post crisis discipline hypothesis (Malaysia 1997) and one episode (Thailand the crisis (17.5%) , and a much lower growth of annual credit several years after the crisis had ended (1.13% in the post-crisis period). Meanwhile, Thailand's post-crisis credit growth did not fit with this pattern. 25% 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 We analyze 42 credit-growth driven banking crisis episodes 15 , out of the 58 advanced and emerging market countries for which we were able to obtain a complete set of data. Based on this sample, in the pre-crisis period (t-3 to t), average annual growth of real credit is 9.86% (std. deviation 7.2%). In the post-crisis period (t+4 to t+7), average annual growth of real credit is 2.82 % (std. deviation 13.8%). The average difference between pre-crisis to post-crisis is -7.04 % points, which is calculated by subtracting the pre-crisis value from the post-crisis value. Thus on average, the countries examined here experienced a lower average real credit growth after the banking crisis. This is illustrated in figure 3 below. In table 3, we provide the episode-by-episode data. We see that there is considerable variation in results. Twenty-eight of the 42 cases (67 percent) are followed by lower credit growth and in 27 out of those 28 cases, the drop in credit growth is greater than 2 percentage points. In 16 of those 28 cases, the drop is ten percentage points or greater. We think it is important to compare these figures using an alternative credit growth indicator, which is the growth in credit/GDP. 16, 17 One argument against simply looking at real credit growth is that high credit growth by itself is not a cause of concern if credit is being used to finance a growing real economy. Therefore, we examined whether the 42 episodes outlined in Table 3 also experience a positive growth in credit/GDP during the pre-crisis period (see table   A1 in the Appendix). Out of these 42 episodes, five experienced a negative growth in credit/GDP in the pre-crisis period. These are Costa Rica (1987 Rica ( , 1994 , Egypt (1980 ), India (1993 and Mexico (1981) . 18 In these five episodes, while credit and GDP both went up, the average growth in credit/GDP is negative because the increase in GDP (the denominator) is greater in magnitude than the increase in real credit (the numerator). This illustration stresses that both indicators have their own strengths and weaknesses. In the future, we will conduct a sensitivity analysis where we will have sub-samples of countries which have positive pre-crisis credit growth according to either measure and another sub-sample where we include only countries with positive real credit growth and positive credit/GDP growth in the pre-crisis period.
We test whether the average difference in credit growth reported in Table 3 is significant. We conduct Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality in distributions, as reported in Figure 4 and Table 4 . Figure 4 shows the kernel densities of the annual growth in real credit for pre-and postcrisis sample periods for the 42 banking crisis episodes with positive growth of real credit in the pre-crisis period. The null of equality of distributions is rejected at the 1% level according to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
16 To be precise, the annual growth in real credit/real GDP. We stress this because credit and GDP are deflated using different price indexes: real credit is deflated using Consumer Price Index, while real GDP is deflated using a GDP deflator.
17 Another alternative to real credit growth is growth of nominal bank credit. However, we excluded this measure given that many of these banking crisis episodes were accompanied by hyperinflation (e.g. Brazil and Argentina), which would act as an upward-bias in nominal credit figures. Using measures such as real credit and real credit/real GDP partly deals with the banking crisis that involved cases of hyperinflation. In their analysis of output recoveries following banking crises, Takats and Upper (2013) who exclude hyperinflation-related crisis episodes.
18 Meanwhile, we also have cases of negative growth in real credit but a positive growth in credit/GDP during the pre-crisis period such as Russia 1998 and Bolivia 1986. As earlier discussed, this can occur if the country experiences negative GDP growth of a larger magnitude than the fall in real credit. As shown in table 4, the change in real credit growth from pre-to post-crisis period is significant for the 42 cases of banking crises that were preceded by positive pre-crisis period credit growth. Not surprisingly we found that the difference is not significant if we include the entire sample of 58 crisis episodes 19 that consisted of both positive and negative pre-crisis period credit growth. Not only is there less scope for falls in credit growth for the countries that did not have pre-crisis real credit growth but it is also more likely that authorities and bankers would see no reason to try to lower future credit growth as credit growth wouldn't appear to have been a major cause of their banking crises.
In figure 5 below we show the relationship between the pre-crisis rates of growth (Y-axis) and the change in the growth rates before and after a banking crisis (X-axis). The plots indicate 19 The test of difference in distributions for the entire sample of 58 crisis episodes is not included here.
Post-Crisis Period (t+4 to t+7)
Pre-Crisis Period (t-3 to t)
Credit Growth: Kernel density estimate a strong negative relationship: the higher the pre-crisis credit growth, the smaller the change in growth rates after the banking crisis. This suggests the possibility that those countries with the highest pre crisis rates of credit growth have weak political, and/or institutional situations that make it difficult to make adjustments in the wake of crises. 20 If correct, this would imply that crises fail to impose substantial discipline for the cases where it is needed most.
Figure 5. Pre-Crisis Real Credit Growth and Change in Growth Rates after the Crisis
In table 5 we investigate whether there are significant regional variations in the patterns.
The regional comparisons, summarized below, show that credit growth after a financial crisis declined substantially in the regions of East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and North America (which contains only the US, since
Canada had no systemic banking crises over the sample period). In the Middle East/North Africa there is little change. Sub-Saharan Africa shows a non trivial increase while in South Asia (Nepal, India, and Sri Lanka), credit growth from the pre-crisis period to the post-crisis period increased by a huge 13.4 %. As shown in table 6 size this was due primarily to Sri Lanka, although all three countries showed credit increases from the pre to post-crisis sample periods. It should be noted that Sri Lanka did not have a particularly high pre-crisis credit growth (2.31%) which is approximately one standard deviation below the average of 10.33%. 20 We are going to test for this in the future. Table 8 below).
In the appendix (Tables A2-A4) , we also present within-region comparisons for Middle East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Europe and Central Asia. On a final note, several countries in our sample had notably high credit growth on the onset year of the crisis, such as Indonesia 1997 (16% annual growth in real credit), Malaysia 1997 (20.5% annual growth in real credit), and Chile 1981 (19.5% annual growth in real credit).This jump in annual CG during the onset year may be a result of public sector intervention to rescue the banking sector. Diaz-Alejandro (1985) and Velasco (1987) have both noted that the bailout of the banking system may have contributed to acceleration in credit creation, as central banks provided subsidized lines of credit to back the financial system's rescheduling of loans, and sectoral lines of credit under soft financial conditions. Since we only have annual data for banking crises, it is also possible that high rates of credit growth in the first part of a year were followed by crises toward the end of the year.
To summarize this section 21 , the majority of the banking crises episodes we examined showed large and statistically significant reductions in credit growth from before to after the crisis. As suggested in the introduction, this drop can be attributed to a combination of different factors besides discipline and what we are likely capturing is the composite of all these effects.
However, by excluding the periods immediately following the crises we believe that we have abstracted from some of the most important of these other influences. Thus our calculations are likely to have captured a substantial element of pure discipline.
IV. Changes in Regulation and Supervision
In this section, we examine the extent to which one of the possible channels of discipline, "regulatory discipline" -the strengthening of bank regulation and supervision-played a role 21 While our analysis captures the behavior of bank credit immediately before and following a banking crisis, there has been an interest in investigating how these two credit growth variables behave in these non-crisis or tranquil periods, where countries are nowhere near a banking crisis. In appendix A5, we present these comparisons in two additional tests. In sum, average real credit growth in the pre-crisis years is quite a bit higher compared to nontranquil years (9.76% in non-tranquil years for real credit growth compared to 6.82%), while considerably lower during the credit-bust years (2.55% in non-tranquil years for real credit growth versus 6.82%).
in explaining the drop in credit growth in the post-crisis period. More effective banking supervision such as on-site audits is a way to discipline banks and prevent excessive credit growth, as the information gained by bank supervisors enables them to more effectively impose remedial measures on imprudent banks (Delis and Staikouras 2011).
The case for attempting to improve regulation and supervision after a crisis should not depend on the rate of credit growth before the crisis so for this purpose we examine our original Such data sets are of course far from perfect proxies, but they have been used in a number of studies (e.g. Ongena et al. 2013, Copelovitch and Singer 2014) , and we believe are worth using.
Among competing data sets 24 on banking regulation and supervision, this CRS index has the most extensive cross-country and time-series coverage. Another advantage is that it includes information on the effectiveness of on-site and off-site bank monitoring, items which several important studies (e.g. As seen in figure 6 below an interesting feature of the data is that across all country groups, the trend in CRS scores has been increasing. Because we are looking at before and after changes over fairly short time periods we have not attempted to de-trend the data but plan to do this in future robustness checks.
Figure 6. Capital Regulation & Supervision (by average income group), 1973-2005
25 Another weakness of this data set is that it has been rescaled by the authors in its published version. Originally, a highly regulated country would have a final score that adds up to 6 (see Appendix B). However, in the dataset this figure is rescaled to be between 0 and 3. The problem arises when interpreting changes in CRS scores from 0 to 1 (e.g. Thailand 1995). We cannot ascertain from which dimension the change originated (capital stringency or effectiveness of on-site monitoring) 26 Barth, Caprio, Levine (2011) has a very wide scope (more than 100 dimensions) ranging from limitations on bank activity, entry regulations, as well as the regulatory features of deposit insurance system. The IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) data set contains useful variables such as regulations on limitations on foreign-currency borrowing and loan-to-value ratios. 80 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
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We begin our specific data analysis by reporting the proportion of countries that improved CRS after a banking crisis versus the countries that remain in a regulatory status quo (see figure   7 ). We found no cases where the regulatory scores declined after a crisis. Out of the 58 countryyear banking crisis episodes in our sample (figure 7, panel A), 26 cases (45%) were followed by an increase in regulatory and supervisory strength within five years 27 after a banking crisis. The remaining 32 cases (55%) did not experience a change in CRS score. 28 These are mainly banking crisis episodes that occurred over the 1980s, which make up roughly 40% of the banking crises in our sample (see figure 8 for a distribution of banking crisis by decades). 29 The story is slightly different for the 1990s. Out of 30 country-year banking crisis episodes in our sample that occurred in the 1990s, 21 cases (70%) were followed by an increase in regulatory and supervisory strength within five years after a banking crisis. The remaining 9 cases (30%),
including Russia 1998, Argentina 1995, and Colombia 1998, did not experience a change in CRS score. 27 We also conducted a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to compare CRS scores from pre-crisis and post-crisis sample periods and found that the difference is significant (p-value=0.0001). We choose these six years as a sample period because most regulatory reforms take place from the onset year up to 5 years after the onset. As seen in figure 9 , there are not much changes in regulatory scores in year t+6. 28 A similar distribution is observed when we look at the smaller sample of countries which had high credit growth before the crisis ( figure 7, panel B) . Out of 42 episodes, 32 (roughly 57%) were not followed by an improvement in CRS scores. 29 In fact, most countries started out with very low CRS scores but after the early 1990s following a relatively widespread adoption of Basel, the average CRS scores started to increase, starting with advanced economies. Figure 8 describes the temporal distribution of changes in regulatory and supervisory strength after crises, to see how many years after the onset of a banking crisis does it take for regulatory reform to occur. The distribution over the crisis year and the four following ones is fairly even with a drop off in year 5 and a further drop in year 6. This indicates that there was considerable variability across reforming countries in the speed with which they adopted reforms.
Figure 7. Proportion of countries with and without post-crisis regulatory changes
In short, the majority of banking-crisis episodes were not followed by a regulatory improvement, but a substantial minority were. This provides considerable scope for further investigation of the factors that influenced whether there was substantial regulatory change 31 . Table 9 32 provides a comparison of the pre-crisis level of CRS scores against the post-crisis change in CRS scores, for both the entire sample and the sub-sample of positive pre-crisis credit growth episodes. For the entire sample, the average improvement is 16 percentage points, which means that on average, CRS scores went up from an initial score of 0.13 to 0.29. There is more than a doubling of CRS scores during the period five years following the onset of a banking 30 E.g. Thailand and Korea implemented regulatory strengthening two years before the onset of a crisis. Five countries, including China (1998) increased their CRS scores one year before the start of a banking crisis. 31 A step in this direction is made by Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2014) , although they focus on an aggregate measure of financial reform and deregulation and not necessarily regulation and supervision per se. They argue that party polarization and political fragmentation which typically follow a banking crisis often prevents the necessary regulatory discipline from taking place. 32 For episode-by-episode data on changes in CRS, please refer to Appendix C. improvement is similar to that for the full sample. In tables 10a and 10b we calculated the regional comparisons of changes in CRS scores.
Figure 8. When do countries increase their CRS scores after a crisis?
As can be seen, the regional distribution is quite uneven. For example, as per table 11a, in both North America and Europe, CRS strengthened by 0.33, while in the Middle East and North Africa region, none of the countries that were hit by a banking crisis increased their regulatory
strength. There appears to be no notable difference in initial CRS scores between the entire sample and the sub-sample of countries with positive pre-crisis credit growth, with the exception of countries in the Sub-Saharan Africa group. High credit-growth countries in this region started out with higher CRS scores (Table 10b ) compared to the Sub-Saharan countries in entire sample (Table 10a) . 33 We calculated changes that occurred within a 5-year window of a banking crisis (t to t+5) and take the difference between it and each country's pre-crisis CRS score. The scores have been rescaled to reflect a continuum between 0(lowest CRS score) and 1(highest CRS score). The third column represents the average difference between the score prior to the crisis and after the crisis. For example, a change of 0.19 means that 0.19 (out of 1) is added to the initial pre-crisis score. Group variation also exists across different income groups of countries, as shown in Table 11 Is there any relationship between a country's initial (i.e. pre-crisis) regulatory regime and the changes that countries made from pre-to post-crisis periods? The initial level of regulatory stringency seems to matter. Compared to countries that had some initial level of substantive regulation (a score of 0.33 or 0.67), countries that started with a score of 0 (which is considered "unregulated"), tended to have somewhat less improvement in CRS after the crisis (see Table   12 ). To be precise, the proportion of initially "unregulated" countries which had improved CRS scores after a crisis is 44% (18 episodes out of 40), while the proportion of countries with higher initial CRS scores which improved CRS scores after the crisis is 55% (10 episodes out of 18).
However, there is little difference in average post-crisis CRS score changes for the two groups.
Out of the 26 episodes which were followed by an increase in CRS, the average score change for the initial unregulated group is 0.35, while the average score change for the higher initial CRS group is 0.33. To sum up, although the majority of the banking crises episodes in our sample (55% for the sample of 58 crises and 57% for the sub-sample of 42 episodes with positive pre-crisis credit growth) are not followed by a change in CRS scores, a substantial minority do. In fact, on average post-crisis CRS scores improved by 0.16, and some countries (e.g. Sweden, see Appendix C) went from a pre-crisis score of 0 to 0.67. Moreover, among the reformers, there is a good deal of variability in the initial pre-crisis CRS scores, and also in the speed with which they adopted regulatory reforms.
V. The Effects of IMF Programs
Our previous data analysis shows that on average, credit growth fell by about 7
percentage points from the pre-to the post-crisis period for the sub-sample of 42 countries with positive pre-crisis credit growth. One of the explanations for this discipline is a learning effect by domestic officials and financial institutions from banking crises. Another potentially important mechanism is that IMF programs following crises could be an external source of discipline. While there is considerable dispute about the effectiveness of IMF programs (see e.g., Bird and Rowlands 2014 , Bird 2007 , and Steinwand and Stone 2008 , we think that it is interesting to test whether the presence of IMF programs influences changes in credit growth from pre-to post-crisis periods.
34 Table 13 presents a distribution of pre-and post-crisis differences in credit growth depending on whether there was an IMF program. 35 We find that countries with IMF programs experience a sharper drop in credit growth after the crisis, which indicates potentially, a greater discipline effect. However, it should also be noted that countries with IMF programs have a higher pre-crisis CG average compared to countries with no IMF programs. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the presence of IMF involvement leads to higher pre-crisis credit growth although this hypothesis would obviously require a good deal more analysis before being accepted. Somewhat surprisingly we found no tendency for IMF programs to have a strong effect on changes in regulation and supervision. Indeed the average change for countries without IMF programs was slightly higher than for those countries with programs, 0.22 versus 0.18 38 Furthermore this was not due to those with IMF programs already having higher CRS scores and 34 Another alternative would be that perhaps private foreign lenders are simply reluctant to lend to countries that recently experienced crises, and this explains why credit growth tends to be slow. For an extension of this paper, it would be interesting to examine whether international capital flows are additional factors that help account for variations in responses to banking crises. 35 We consider crisis episodes that were followed by an IMF stand-by arrangement up to 3 years after the onset of the banking crisis to be an episode with an IMF program and otherwise, no IMF program. 36 We are currently investigating the association of pre-crisis IMF programs with credit growth. 37 The differences in credit growth change for the two groups (with and without IMF) is not statistically significant. The p-value of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are higher than the conventional levels of significance. 38 Burkina Faso, China, India, Jamaica, Japan, Malaysia, Nepal, Norway, Sweden, Tanzania, Uganda, and the United States are the nations in the sample that did not receive post-crisis IMF programs.
36
hence having less room for increases. The average initial level for the IMF program countries was .07 compared with .12 for the others.
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VI. Effects of Democracy
VI.1. Democracy and Credit Growth
As discussed in previous sections, although the majority of credit growth-driven banking crises in our sample show substantial reductions in credit after the crisis, there are considerable variations in the pre-and post-crisis period growth rates of credit across different regions and also within countries in the same region. In this section, we investigate the extent to which political and institutional variables help explain these differences. Interestingly, in the 42 banking crisis episodes that we investigate, democracies and non-democracies (based on the regime category observed during the onset of the banking crisis) are quite evenly split (although there are more democracies, see Table 14 ), thus we focus on democracy scores. 40 The average number of crises per country is 26/22 (for democracies) and 16/16 (for non-democracies). We also note that countries that improve regulations and supervision experience larger drops in real credit growth compared to those that do not improve CRS (-6.57% versus -.3.75%), although this difference is not significant based on a Kalmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution. Meanwhile, there is no substantive nor significant difference in the post-crisis changes in the growth rate of Credit/GDP between countries that do and do not improve their CRS scores. We are currently investigating reasons behind this. 40 The left column of table 13 includes countries that are considered democracies today (as of 2010 data) such as Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay. The average number of crises per country would change depending on the measure of democracy used. If we use the combined Freedom House and Polity 2 scores, there is an even split between democracies and democracies at the year of the crisis onset (21-21). United States 1988 Source: Polity 2 based on the democracy score observed during the onset year of the crisis. * indicate that these were considered autocracies according to the combined Freedom House and Polity 2 category defined by Hadenius and Teorell (2007) .
There is a growing literature on how different political regimes (authoritarian versus democratic) contribute to the likelihood of banking crises (e.g. Lipscy 2011, McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 2013) and shape policy responses to these crises (e.g. Mian et al. 2014 , Rosas et al. 2013 , Rosas 2009 , Ha and Kang 2012 , Pepinsky 2008 , Rodrik 1999 ), yet the role of democracy in enhancing or impeding the discipline effect provided by financial crises is quite rarely studied. 41 Thus we compare democracy scores and the change in credit growth from the pre-to post-crisis period, and test whether there is any relationship between democracy and financial regulatory and supervisory reform, for the sample of 42 banking crisis episodes preceded by positive credit growth.
42
To capture degrees of democracy, we use Polity 2 democracy levels and also a dichotomous variable for democracies versus non-democracies. According to Mukherjee et al. (2013) , if polity2 score is greater than +4, the country in question is considered a democracy.
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For a robustness check, we also use the combined Freedom House and Polity2 index. According to Hadenius and Teorell (2007) , if the combined Freedom House and Polity Scores (on a scale of 0-10) is greater than 7.5, the country in question is considered a democracy. It should be noted that many of the countries in our sample experience a regime change/transition, from authoritarian to more democratic regimes.
44
41 Campello (2014) discusses democracy and discipline, but in the context of discipline provided by elections. 42 We do not start with strong a priori expectations about the effects of the degree of democracy on financial policy responses to crises given that there are a number of competing hypotheses concerning the political and institutional factors that will influence policy responses to crises. This is an area that could be investigated for future research.. 43 See Hogstrom (2013) for a survey on the use of democracy indices in political science. 44 We found a statistically significant increase in democracy from the pre-to the post-crisis sample period This is not entirely surprising given that it has been documented elsewhere (e.g. Gasiorowski 1995 , Pepinsky 2008 ) that economic and financial crises often lead to the breakdown of authoritarian regimes. In our sample, out of the 16 nondemocratic regimes (at the time of the crisis), four experienced a regime switch to democracies within five years after the crisis began (Argentina 1980 , Indonesia 1997 , Mexico 1994 , and Nepal 1988 . With the exception of Nepal, these countries were considered highly authoritarian (Polity scores lower than -7). Nine out of 16 episodes were followed by an increase in Polity 2 scores five years from the crisis onset, which means the countries became "less" authoritarian from pre-to post-crisis periods (e.g. Jordan 1989 and Kenya 1992) . There are no cases of We document the relationship between democracy and changes in credit growth from pre-to post-crisis periods in table 15 and figure 9 below. We transform the original democracy scores from each indicator into a dichotomous (democracy vs non-democracies) variable. It appears that democracies experience a substantially stronger drop in credit growth from pre-to post-crisis periods, compared to autocracies, -7.5% versus -4.3%. However, these differences are not significant. 45 The null of equality of distributions is not rejected at any of the conventional levels according to a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The difference in credit growth changes between the two groups is much starker if we use democracy data from Polity 2.
Here the difference is -8.4% versus -3.4%, or almost 5 percentage points. 
Non Democracies (2) Difference (1)- (2) Average change in credit growth from pre-to post-crisis (Combined Freedom House and Polity) -7.51% -4.3% -3.21%
Average change in credit growth from pre-to post-crisis (Polity Score) -8.37% -3.43% -4.94% regime switches from democracies to autocracies in our sample of 42 episodes, although three of the 16 episodes were followed by no change in Polity 2 scores five years after the crisis (China 1998 , Malaysia 1997 , and Thailand 1983 . 
VI.2. Democracy and Financial Regulation and Supervision
We look at the democratic characteristics of countries that experience regulatory reform after a banking crisis versus those that do not. 46 Tables 16a and 16b compare democracy scores for the two groups of countries: those which improved their capital regulation and supervision after the crisis, and those whose CRS scores remained the same after a crisis. Figure 10 plots the Kernel Density estimates for the two groups, using Polity 2 scores. The results show that there is a large and statistically significant difference in average democracy scores between countries 46 Other questions that we could look at are: how many repeat crisis offenders experienced regime switch from autocracy to democracy? Did they experience a lower credit growth the second crisis around? This presents strong evidence that the less democratic is a country the less likely is reform. This in turn suggests that greater democracy acts as an important counter to the influence of financial special interests at times when financial issues rise to the top of public awareness such as tends to occur during and shortly after financial crises 48 . 
No change in CRS post-crisis (2) Difference (1)- (2) Average Democracy Score 
No change in CRS post-crisis (2) Difference (1)- (2) Average Democracy Score 7.23 5.46 1.77* 47 Our findings suggest much stronger reforms in the area of supervision and regulation after crises than Mian et al. (2014) find for an aggregate measure of financial liberalization. They also find that there are a "substantial share" of cases where reforms go in a less liberal direction. 48 Mian et al. (2014) find evidence that crises are accompanied by increases in political polarization.
Figure 10. CRS and Democracy
In short, the preliminary analysis conducted here provides some supporting evidence that democracy plays a role in enhancing ex post discipline following banking crises. Democracies tend to have stronger financial regulation and supervision, and more substantial reductions in credit growth following financial crises.
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VII. Concluding Comments
The frequency of major financial crises demonstrates that there are often serious deficiencies in the provision of ex ante discipline over financial behavior. In this paper we investigate whether crises themselves provide some degree of ex post discipline. Our primary focus is on rates of credit growth which have been found to be an important determinant of financial crises. While changes in the rate of credit growth after crises may be influenced by many factors we believe that discipline effects are a major influence on the before and after rates of credit growth that we calculate, especially as we delete the periods immediately following crises where the disruptive effects of the crises generally lead to sharp declines in the provision 49 We also found that on average democracy scores are were higher in the post-crisis sample than the pre-crisis sample period. This is consistent with previous research (i.e. Gasiorowski 1995) that financial crises often contribute to the breakdown of authoritarian regimes. While we do not want to make too much of our preliminary findings this is a topic that deserves further study. and that these changes are large and generally statistically significant. There is also a great deal of variability across regions and countries, however.
Discipline effects may come both from changes in government policies and from increased prudence in private sector behavior. As a start at attempting to unbundle these various effects we investigate the impact of crises on changes in government financial supervision and regulation. We find that for a substantial minority of countries there are increases in the degree of regulation and supervision following crises. For both rates of credit growth and degrees of supervision we found a good deal of variability in the magnitudes of these post-crisis improvements within and across different regions and levels of economic development.
This substantial variability of responses raises the issue of what factors influence these differences. We investigate two such possible factors, the degree of democracy and the presence of IMF programs. 50 We find that democracies experience a greater drop in rates of credit expansion in post-crisis periods and that more democratic regimes in our sample are also more likely to increase their CRS scores after crises. We also find that IMF programs are associated with substantial increases in post crisis discipline, suggesting that at least in this area IMF programs have a good deal of effectiveness. On the other hand we found a somewhat surprising result that increases in regulation and supervision were not significantly associated with greater reductions in real credit growth, suggesting a lack of effectiveness on their part. This is an issue that clearly calls for more research.
There is considerable scope to expand investigation of possible explanations of the differences in responses to other political and institutional factors such as the number of veto players. While we focus on banking crisis in this study, we believe similar studies of fiscal and currency crises would also be well worthwhile as would looking at possible discipline effects on monetary and fiscal policies and on whether crises make future crises less likely.
50 In the future, besides using the ratio of credit to GDP as our credit variable and the Reinhart and Rogoff data set for financial crises we plan to complement our analysis with econometric regression to test the effects of changes in CRS and democracy on the changes in credit growth from the pre-to the post-crisis periods. Table 3 No. 
APPENDIX. A1. Annual Growth of Credit/GDP Pre to Post-Crisis Period based on the 42 Episodes identified in
A5. What Does Credit Growth Look Like in "Tranquil" (Non-Crisis) Years?
The earlier paragraphs established that on average, out of a sub-set of 42 at least partially credit-driven banking crisis episodes, our measures of credit growth (annual percent change in real credit and real credit/real GDP) dropped by about 7% points from pre-to post-crisis periods. While deleting years immediately after the crisis, our time window of pre-and post-crisis sample captures the behavior of credit growth during what are called distressed or non-tranquil periods (see e.g. Gourinchas and Obstfeld 2012) . It is worth investigating how these two credit growth variables behave in these non-crisis or tranquil periods, where countries are nowhere near a banking crisis. How do they compare to the crisis periods?
We conduct two additional tests to answer this question. First, we calculate compare average credit growth during pre-crisis period, post-crisis period, and tranquil years, which is defined as all other years that are not part of pre-, during, and post-crisis sample period, following the suggestion of Gourinchas and Obstfeld. In table 9, we report this comparison for two measures of credit, real credit growth and growth in real credit/real GDP. The pattern that emerges from Table 9 is that during the credit-boom years (pre-crisis average), average credit growth is higher compared to non-tranquil years (9.76% in non-tranquil years for real credit growth compared to 6.82%), while considerably lower during the credit-bust years (2.55% in non-tranquil years for real credit growth versus 6.82%). As an alternative way of comparing how credit behaves in crisis versus tranquil times, we estimate "the conditional expectation of credit growth as a function of the temporal distance from a banking crisis, relative to a common tranquil time baseline." (Gourinchas and Obstfeld, p. 237) . We regress separately three indicators of credit growth (real credit growth, growth of real Credit/real GDP, and growth of nominal credit) on a dummy variable which equals to one for pre-and post-crisis sample years [t-3, t+3] , and equals zero otherwise. In other words, all other years outside this 7-year window would be coded as zero. We also check for robustness using a dummy variable that equals 1 for periods t-5 to t+5, and zero for other "tranquil" years and obtain similar results. The estimating equation is described in equation (1) (1) where Dcrisis3= is a dummy variable that equals 1 for the sample period 3 years before a crisis, the crisis year, and 3 years after a crisis.
Estimating equation (1) using panel country and time-fixed effects, the estimated size of the β1 coefficients range from -0.036 to -0.041, and are significant at the 1% level for the variable real credit growth, but not for growth of real credit/GDP or growth of nominal GDP. This means that the difference between expected value of credit growth during non-tranquil and tranquil years can be as high 4.1% points (the average annual credit growth in the sample is 5.76%). The negative sign on the Dcrisis3 estimated coefficient suggests that taking non-tranquil and tranquil times together, the post-crisis credit busts have a larger effect than the pre-crisis credit booms. The Capital Regulation and Supervision (CRS) Index constructed by Abiad et al. is a scaled index going from 0-3,where 3 is the highest score. These scores are coded by authors based on various official and unofficial country policy reports and expert opinion reports. The authors of the database rely on their judgment for the scoring but use specific questions to guide the scoring. The guidelines are outlined below, categorized along the 4 different dimensions which they use to quantify FRS:
51 It is unclear why the authors (Gourinchas and Obstfeld) decided to use pre-crisis years as part of their definition of non-tranquil years, given that credit growth is on average the largest during this period, which is also known as the credit boom period. This formulation does not seem to be appropriate for the specific question of our research since it combines pre-and post-crisis data. Nevertheless, an interesting follow-up question to tackle in the future is to estimate the size of the bust, relative to the size of the boom. 
